I. INTRODUCTION
Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in the fall of 2008, Asian economies have experienced substantial growth swings. In the initial stages of the crisis, as global aggregate demand dropped due to the falling consumer and investor confidence, exports from all major East Asian economies declined sharply. Imports from these countries also plummeted at almost similar rates to those of export declines, reflecting the tightly knit regional production networks and supply chains in Asia. Given the high trade dependence in most Asian economies, the slump in trade significantly dragged down their economic growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009.
But the Asian economies rebounded strongly beginning in the second quarter of 2009. The extraordinarily massive economic stimulus provided by governments and central banks across major advanced and emerging economies-including those in Asia-in response to the crisis helped stabilize financial markets, improved the confidence of investors and consumers, and fostered the recovery of economic activity.
1 As a result, the inventory cycle turned from depleting to rebuilding in most parts of the world and global trade rebounded. The improved external environment, together with stronger domestic demand spurred by these policy stimulus measures, led to a dramatic V-shaped recovery in Asian economies. By the end of 2009, most Asian economies resumed their pre-crisis growth levels. Some of them have begun to moderate their macroeconomic stimulus policies in the face of the increasing risks of overheating, inflation, and asset price bubbles.
The global recovery now remains on track but faces considerable downside risks. The recent unfolding of the European sovereign debt crisis has highlighted the risks arising from the rapid accumulation of public debt, suggesting that the positive effects of fiscal stimulus could be more than offset by the markets' concerns over long-term debt sustainability. With most advanced economies embracing fiscal consolidation in the coming years and inventory restocking gradually running its course, the future pace of global recovery will be largely contingent on the degree to which the sources of demand are able to shift from the public to the private sector. However, given that the reconstruction of the financial sector and the deleveraging of private balance sheets could take a long time to resolve and that the unemployment rate remains high in major advanced economies, we expect to observe a slower global economic growth and consequently an extended shortfall in global aggregate demand in the years to come.
The slower growth of aggregate demand in advanced economies will pose significant challenges for Asian economies. With an export-oriented development strategy, emerging Asian economies have maintained not only high growth, but also large current account surpluses in the past decade, contributing to the global current account imbalance. As economic growth in advanced economies remains slow, in order to sustain growth, Asian economies need to change the source of their growth from exports to extraregional markets to regional and domestic. The reorientation of growth toward Asia's internal demand can contribute to the orderly correction of the global imbalance. In fact, the ongoing crisis has indeed 1 Immediately after the eruption of the global financial crisis, governments and central banks around the world responded swiftly to deal with liquidity and solvency problems of affected financial institutions through easing monetary policy and recapitalizing or restructuring troubled financial institutions. In addition to such measures, fiscal stimulus packages have been implemented around the world to boost demand. The IMF estimated that the total amount of fiscal stimulus in the G-20 countries amounts to $692 billion in 2009, about 1.4% of their combined GDP. The US, People's Republic of China, Japan, and Germany are the key contributors of global fiscal stimulus, with stimulus packages worth approximately 2% of their respective GDP.
induced a partial and disorderly correction of the global imbalance, with a large contraction of demand in the United States (US), a sharp increase in US household savings and an improvement in its current account. This adjustment has not been accompanied by the collapse of the US dollar, however, as was feared by many experts and policymakers before the outbreak of the financial crisis; it has been accompanied by a global collapse of trade and output, and a rise in unemployment. The ongoing ultra-expansionary monetary policy-including quantitative easing-could lead to a sharp US dollar depreciation, which may exert significant adjustment pressures on Asian economies.
The aim of this paper is to provide a model-based analysis of the adjustment of Asian economies in the wake of the global financial crisis. Specifically, it attempts to answer the following questions: What are the macroeconomic impacts of the global financial crisis on Asian economies? What are the effects of global fiscal stimulus, and how would it contribute to mitigate the impacts of the ongoing crisis? What are the roles of East Asia in the rebalancing of global demand following the crisis? How much will emerging East Asia's efforts at currency appreciation and structural reforms for its own growth rebalancing contribute to sustained global economic growth? We use a multiregion, intertemporal dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy to simulate different scenarios for the global financial crisis. Our quantitative simulations suggest that East Asia is unlikely to be severely damaged permanently by the global financial crisis, and a worldwide fiscal stimulus could play an important role in stabilizing the global economy in crisis. East Asia's efforts toward strengthening regional and domestic demand, in conjunction with more flexible exchange rate regimes in the region, will promote more balanced regional growth, facilitating an orderly global rebalancing. However, despite the growing size of emerging East Asia in the global economy, Asia-led growth rebalancing has only modest spillover effects on the rest of the world. Even though emerging East Asia can contribute to global growth, it alone cannot become the global engine driving post-crisis growth in the world economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model used in the analysis. Section III discusses the design of the simulation scenarios, reports their results, and provides our interpretation. Finally Section IV offers conclusions.
II. THE MODEL
The model used in this study is a version of a multi-country dynamic general equilibrium model for the world economy inspired by the new open economy macroeconomics literature (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995 and 1996) . It combines the long-run properties of neoclassical models with short-run dynamics arising from nominal rigidities à la new Keynesian macroeconomics. The structure of the model closely follows the global integrated monetary and fiscal model (GIMF) developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Research Department (Kumhof and Laxton 2007; Laxton 2008) .
2 Agents in the model are forward looking, endowed with perfect foresight and subject to the dynamic budget constraints. The model features overlapping generations agents with finite economic lifetime. This leads to the non-Ricardian feature of the model and makes it suitable for fiscal policy analysis. Countries and regions in the model are linked through trade and financial markets. Nominal price and wage stickiness, as well as real frictions in investment, are incorporated to generate more realistic adjustment dynamics. The presence of nominal price and wage rigidity allows monetary policy to play a key role. Different from the GIMF, our model is deterministic, excluding stochastic shocks or other uncertainties. The model is in annual frequency and calibrated to the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) (version 7) global database with 2004 as the base year. This section outlines the basic structure of the model and discusses its parameterization. The detailed specifications of the model are described in the Appendix.
A. Model Structure
The world economy in the model consists of four economic blocs: the US, Japan, emerging East Asia (EEA), and the rest of the world (ROW). There are four agents in each region, namely, households, unions, firms, and government. Households have finite lives, facing a constant probability of survival, as in the perpetual youth model in line with Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965) . Households consume a basket of goods and services and exhibit habit persistence in their consumption. The model distinguishes two types of households: forwardlooking ones and liquidity-constrained ones. The former own the portfolio of domestic firms. They also hold two types of nominal bonds: domestic bonds issued by the domestic government denominated in domestic currency, and international bonds issued by the US and denominated in US dollars. International bonds are traded only bilaterally with the US and issued in zero net supply worldwide. The liquidity-constrained households do not have access to domestic or international capital markets. They finance their consumption exclusively with current disposable labor and transfer incomes. Firms' investment is subject to adjustment costs, which allow for the variation in Tobin's q and generate plausible investment dynamics.
The model assumes a continuum of unions in each economic bloc which purchase labor services from households and sell labor to firms.
3 Unions are monopolistic suppliers of differentiated labor inputs to domestic firms and face nominal rigidities in wage setting. They set nominal wages according to constantelasticity downward-sloping demand schedules and quadratic costs of wage adjustment as in Rotemberg (1982) .
The production activity is characterized by monopolistic competition. There is a continuum of firms in the production sector which produce differentiated varieties of products. They set the nominal prices of their products in domestic and exporting markets to maximize the present discounted value of profits. Similar to wage setting, price changes are subject to adjustment costs, which give rise to nominal price rigidities. When exporting, firms set prices in terms of the export-market currency, i.e., traded goods are invoiced in the currencies of the importing economic bloc.
Production technology in each sector is modeled using nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and Cobb-Douglas functions. At the top level, the output is produced as a combination of public capital and an aggregate private input using Cobb-Douglas technology. At the second level, the aggregate private input is split into an intermediate input and a bundle of private capital and labor inputs. At the third level, the bundle of capital and labor inputs is further disaggregated into capital and aggregate labor. Finally, at the bottom level, aggregate labor is decomposed into the differentiated labor input by each union. At each level of production, there is a unit cost function that is dual to the CES aggregation function and demand functions for corresponding inputs. The toplevel unit cost function defines the marginal cost of sectoral output. The stock of public capital is identical for all firms and provided free of charge to them. As the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale for private inputs, the return to public capital is distributed to firms as profits.
International trade is modeled using a nested Armington structure, in which domestic absorption is allocated between domestic goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate imports are allocated across sourcing countries, which determine bilateral trade flows. Demand for domestic and imported goods is expressed as a composite good defined by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator over domestic and imported varieties, respectively.
The government collects tax and issues debt to finance its budget deficit. There are five types of tax in the model: labor income tax, capital income tax, sales tax, import tariff, and lump-sum tax on households. Government consumption and investment are exogenous and the lump-sum tax on households is endogenously adjusted to achieve a target path for the desired government debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio. The monetary policy rule in the model follows a Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor rule in which the nominal interest rate depends on the lagged nominal interest rate, the inflation gap and the output growth gap (see Appendix equation A52). 4 For EEA, the monetary policy rule is augmented with the gap between the actual and desired values of the bilateral nominal exchange rate against the US dollar, reflecting the dollar stabilization regimes in some EEA economies.
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B.
Model Calibration
The calibration of a dynamic model with the assumption of perfect foresight involves finding a set of data that covers all periods of the model and is consistent with the intra-period and intertemporal equilibria. This set of data needs to replicate the data of the base year and could serve as the dynamic benchmark equilibrium of the model. There could be two alternative calibration strategies here. The first one, the so-called steady state calibration, would consider the base year as a steady state equilibrium and the dynamic benchmark equilibrium of the model as a steady state growth path. The second one would assume that the economy in the base year is a temporal equilibrium along a dynamic adjustment path, that is, the dynamic benchmark equilibrium of the model is a transitional dynamic path to a final steady state (Knudsen et al 1998; Wendner 1999 ). Here we follow the second approach and calibrate the model for a non-steady state situation.
The model is calibrated to GTAP database (version 7), with 2004 as the base year. The GTAP database contains a set of consistent input-output tables and bilateral trade data with detailed country and sector disaggregation. For most elasticity parameters and dynamic adjustment parameters, we draw on the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF) and other dynamic general equilibrium models in determining their values.
In calibrating the household sector, we assume that in the US, Japan, and the ROW the share of liquidity-constrained consumers is 25%. In EEA the share is higher at 40%, reflecting the underdeveloped nature of financial markets in this region. The households are assumed to have a finite planning horizon of 20 years, implying a constant yearly death rate of 5%. In addition, the labor productivity of each generation is assumed to decline throughout his lifetime at an annual rate of 5%. The value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 0.33, slightly higher than those chosen in the GIMF model. The habit persistence parameter for consumption is set to 0.4 as in Kumhof and Laxton (2007) . We set the weight parameters of leisure and consumption in the household's utility function in such a way that on aggregate 33% of available time endowment during work years is spent at work in the base year. The rate of time preference in each economic bloc is set to obtain a reasonable net foreign asset position in the steady state.
In the supply side, elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is set at 0.8. The substitution elasticity between labor varieties, which determines the markup in the labor market, is assumed to be 7.3 in the US, Japan, and EEA and 6.0 in ROW. This assumption implies relatively competitive labor markets in the US, Japan, and EEA. The depreciation rate of capital is assumed to be 8% per year. The data for capital stock in each economic bloc is taken from the GTAP database. The ratio of public capital to GDP is assumed to be 30% in the base year and the elasticity of GDP with respect to public capital is assumed to be 0.1.
Following the literature of business cycle models, the substitution elasticities between imports and domestic goods, i.e. the Armington elasticities, are set equal to 2.0.
6 The substitution elasticity of imports across economic blocs is 2.5. Elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods ranges from 4.3 to 6.0, implying a markup of 20% to 30%. Japan and ROW have relatively high markups while the markups in the US and EEA are lower.
The parameters for nominal rigidity and real adjustment costs that govern the dynamics of the model are drawn from the GIMF and the Global Economic Model (GEM) of the IMF. In the monetary policy rule, the weights for the inflation gap and for the output growth gap are both set at 0.5. For EEA, the weight on the changes in exchange rate is set to 1. In the simulations for fiscal stimulus below in Section III, an alternative accommodative monetary policy rule is used with the weight of 0.5 for the inflation gap and a zero weight for the output growth gap.
In the baseline scenario for model calibration, EEA is assumed to have a higher growth rate of productivity in initial periods. Its labor-augmented productivity grows at 10% in the base year and gradually declines to the global average growth trend of 3% after 25 years. In contrast, productivity growth in Japan is assumed to rise from 1.6% in the base year to 3% in the period after 25 years. The consumer price index (CPI) inflation target is set to 2% per annum for all regions. Time preference rates in the base year are endogenously determined in the baseline scenario to match the base year consumption in each economic bloc. These base year time preference rates are assumed to gradually converge to their long-run values within 40 years. Similarly, a constant adjustment parameter for Tobin's q is added to the arbitrage equation for each sector's q to reproduce the baseline-scenario investment level in the base year. The trade literature on empirical estimation of the Armington elasticity usually found a high value ranging from about 6 to 15, and these estimates are typically used in applied general equilibrium models for trade policy analysis (see, e.g. Hertel et al. 2004 ). See Ruhl (2003) for a reconciliation of the low elasticity value found in aggregate high frequency time series data with the high elasticity found in cross-section data.
7 This constant adjustment parameter can be interpreted as risk premium. See McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998) for a similar treatment in their multi-sectoral, intertemporal G-Cubed model.
III. SIMULATION SCENARIOS
To explore the implications of the global financial crisis for East Asia, we simulate five scenarios. All these scenarios are simulated in a cumulative fashion, so that the second scenario includes the first as well as the second shocks; the third includes the first, second, and third shocks, and so on.
The first scenario examines the effects of a global financial crisis. It assumes a world-wide temporary drop in final demand triggered by the financial crisis. In the US, households are assumed to be more concerned about their future-their desire to save increases and their consumption declines. In the model this is represented by lowering forward-looking households' time preference by two percentage points per annum permanently. The risk premium of investors in the US is assumed to rise by five percentage points for the next three years and gradually decline after that until it vanishes in another three years. In addition to the US, all other regions also experience a fall in consumption and investment due to the contagion through financial and confidence channels. The shocks in non-US regions are assumed to be half of that in the US, i.e., a one percentage point reduction in households' time preference rate and a 2.5 percentage points rise of investor's risk premium.
The second scenario considers the effects of globally concerted expansionary fiscal policies to deal with the global financial crisis. We assume a global fiscal stimulus package under which all countries increase government spending by 2% of GDP over a two-year period. Such government spending is assumed to be distributed evenly between government consumption and investment. The fiscal stimulus is assumed to be temporary, as in the period following the expenditure expansion, lump-sum taxes adjust to return the government debt-to-GDP ratio back to its baseline value over time. As monetary policy can play an important role in determining the effects of fiscal expansion, the simulations here explore two types of a monetary policy rule for the two years of fiscal stimulus, that is, the standard interest rate rule in our benchmark model and an accommodative interest rate rule. The standard interest rate rule has equal weights on the inflation gap and the output growth gap, while the accommodative interest rate rule has a zero weight on the output growth gap. Given that fiscal expansion tends to raise both output and inflation, the interest rate hikes are smaller in the latter policy rule, suggesting a more accommodative monetary policy in the face of fiscal stimulus.
The final two scenarios look at the impact of other types of policy measures designed to rebalance growth in EEA. The third scenario examines the role of exchange rate policy. It assumes that EEA allows large currency movements against the US dollar by putting a zero weight on the exchange rate gap in its monetary policy reaction function. The fourth scenario postulates that, in addition to greater exchange rate flexibility, EEA boosts its domestic consumption and investment through structural reforms. Instead of specifying the exact nature for these structural reforms, we capture their effects using a permanent one percentage point increase in the time preference rate of EEA's forward-looking households and a one percentage point reduction of its investors' risk premium. These two scenarios simulate a partial global rebalancing initiative led by the adjustment in EEA.
A. A Global Financial Crisis
The results of the scenario of the global financial crisis are reported in Figure 1 . The global financial crisis leads to a sharp output loss in the US, with real GDP falling by 6% in the first two years compared with the baseline. The GDP reduction is tempered after that and output begins to expand after seven years, driven by stronger net external demand and the recovery in investment. As to the components of domestic demand, investment exhibits greater volatility than consumption. It contracts by around 15% in the initial years and then jumps up by nearly 20% along with the diminished investment risk premium after 12-15 years. In comparison with investment, the change in private consumption is more modest, but still significant. The consumption of US households declines by 9% in the first three years, but begins to increase after fifteen years because of the expanded output and income.
As the shrinking domestic absorption significantly drags down imports, the US current account as a ratio to GDP improves by around 3-4 percentage points in the first five years. This improvement in the current account gradually diminishes to 3% of GDP in the medium-term. The falling US demand depresses US domestic prices relative to foreign prices, leading to a real depreciation of the US dollar. The real effective exchange rate of the US dollar weakens by 7-8% initially relative to the baseline. The US dollar depreciation moderates to 4% in fifteen years. The more rapid recovery of domestic demand relative to supply implies an excess demand in the medium term, thereby moderating the pace of US dollar depreciation.
The dynamics of prices are driven by supply and demand conditions, the degree of nominal rigidities, and monetary policy reactions. In tandem with the initial demand collapse, inflation falls by two percentage points initially. After five years, the drop in the inflation rate narrows to less than half of a percentage point. Lower inflation leads to a lower interest rate-through the Taylor rulebased monetary policy-causing larger interest differentials between the US and other economic blocs, which reinforces the initial US dollar depreciation. Nominal exchange rate changes are the major channel to achieve real exchange rate adjustment, reflecting the sluggish price responses, and the effects of inflation targeting and flexible exchange rates. For other regions, the contagion-induced demand drops cause significant impacts on their domestic economy. Both consumption and investment fall in initial years in comparison with the baseline in Japan and ROW, leading to a sharp contraction in their real GDP. CPI inflation drops by as much as two percentage points initially in these two regions. In EEA, despite a larger drop in the nominal interest rate in response to lower inflation, consumption hardly expands in the first six years and investment increases only by 2% or so initially. As a result, EEA real GDP shrinks by 1% in the first three years in comparison with the baseline.
Exchange rate policy plays an important role in determining the impact of a global financial crisis. This is evident from the divergent movements in real exchange rates in initial years between Japan (and ROW) and EEA. As shown in Figure 1 , while both Japan and ROW experience large real appreciation initially, the real exchange rate of EEA depreciates in the first three years because of the non-zero weight on the gap of the nominal exchange rate against the US dollar in its monetary policy rule. Consequently, the export and current account balance of EEA only decline slightly in the initial two years, in contrast to those in Japan and ROW.
B. Global Fiscal Expansion with Alternative Monetary Policy Rules
The second scenario assumes that all economic blocs in the world increase government spending-by 2% of GDP-for two years, while following their respective monetary policy rules. Figure 2A presents the dynamic impacts of globally concerted fiscal stimulus packages under the benchmark monetary policy rule, which are plotted as changes from the second scenario-i.e., the scenario of a global financial crisis. The benchmark monetary policy rule follows the standard Taylor rule, except in EEA where the interest rate responds positively to the exchange rate gap as well as the inflation and output growth gaps. With the temporary fiscal expansion all over the world, real GDP, consumption and investment all rise during the period of fiscal stimulus and beyond. The increase in real GDP during the two years of fiscal expansion is around 1.5%, suggesting fiscal multipliers of 0.75. GDP drops by around 0.2% after the completion of fiscal stimulus, but begins to expand by around 0.5% after six years, largely due to the larger stock of public capital. Increased fiscal expenditures lead to more employment and higher wages, boosting private consumption. EEA experiences the largest rise in private consumption during the period of fiscal expansion, reflecting its higher share of liquidity-constrained households. During the years of fiscal stimulus, private investment drops by around 4% in the US, Japan, and ROW, and more than 2% in EEA reflecting the crowding-out effects through rises in interest rates. However, private investment enjoys larger gains in the medium-and long-term, thanks to the long term crowding-in effect of public investment. Current account balances and real exchange rates are generally little impacted by the world-wide fiscal expansion. Fiscal deficits in the two expansion years widen by 1.7-1.8% of GDP, as government spending of 2% of GDP is offset by additional tax revenues due to faster economic growth. Consequently, the ratio of government debt to GDP rises only by two to three percentage points in the fourth year, then gradually falls to the baseline level with increases in household lump-sum tax. Figure 2B presents the effects of global fiscal stimulus under the accommodative monetary policy rule, where the interest rate responds only to the inflation gap (and the exchange rate gap in EEA). With monetary accommodation, inflation is generally higher and the real interest rate is lower, which facilitates the expansion of consumption and investment. As a result, there is almost no crowding out of fiscal spending. This is in sharp contrast to the simulation results under the benchmark monetary policy rule (as shown in Figure 2A ), where private investment during the years of fiscal expansion is negatively affected, showing evidence of strong crowding-out effects of public expenditure.
To deepen our analysis of the impact of globally concerted fiscal stimulus, we have run separate simulations under which each economic bloc alone engages in fiscal stimulus. First, the fiscal multipliers rise significantly by moving from the benchmark monetary policy rule to the accommodative monetary policy rule in every region of the world. Under the benchmark rule, the fiscal multipliers are in the range of 0.55 (Japan) to 0.80 (EEA), while under the accommodative rule they rise to the range of 1.01 (EEA) to 1.42 (US). This can be explained by the change in the interest rate rule from the one that responds to the output growth gap (benchmark rule) to the one that does not (accommodative rule). Under the benchmark rule, the interest rate rises in response to both the inflationary pressure and output expansion (and the exchange rate gap in EEA) arising from fiscal stimulus, while under the accommodative rule the interest rate rises less responding only to the inflationary pressure (and the exchange rate gap in EEA). In other words, the smaller interest rate increase makes the fiscal multipliers larger under the accommodative rule than under the benchmark monetary policy rule.
Second, the extent of the rise in fiscal multipliers, associated with a move from the benchmark to the accommodative policy rule, varies across regions in the world; fiscal multipliers rise the least in EEA (from 0.80 to 1.01) while those in other regions rise much more substantially (e.g., from 0.61 to 1.42 in the US). This can be explained by the specific interest rate rule chosen for EEA, i.e., the inclusion of the exchange rate gap, as well as this region's large trade leakage from its imports. Under either monetary policy rule, EEA's interest rate would rise the least among the four regions in the world because the interest rate rise resulting from the positive inflationary gap (and the output growth gap under the benchmark rule) associated with fiscal expansion would be partly offset by the interest rate decline resulting from the real currency appreciation pressure. Under the benchmark monetary policy rule-even though the impact of fiscal expansion would leak out most substantially in EEA to other regions due to its having the highest ratio of imports to GDP-the favorable effect of the interest rate change dominates the unfavorable trade leakage effect, thereby making EEA's fiscal multiplier the largest in the world. Under the accommodative monetary policy rule, however, EEA's own fiscal multiplier is 1.01, the smallest among the four economic blocs. This is explained by the fact that the favorable interest rate effect is more than offset by the unfavorable trade leakage effect. That is, although EEA's interest rate rises the least, in response to its own fiscal expansion, among the four regions in the world, the large trade leakage effect dominates the interest rate effect, thereby making EEA's fiscal multiplier the smallest in the world.
Finally, under the accommodative monetary policy rule, nearly 30% of the impact of the global financial expansion on the EEA's fiscal multiplier effect comes from the stimulus in other regions. This suggests that, under an accommodative global monetary policy environment, a globally coordinated fiscal stimulus action will be desirable for EEA (as well as for other economic blocs in the world).
C. Greater Exchange Rate Flexibility in Emerging East Asia
The results of the third scenario-impacts of increasing exchange rate flexibility of the EEA currency vis-à-vis the US dollar-are presented in Figure  3A . As a result of dropping the exchange rate target in its monetary policy rule, EEA's nominal exchange rate appreciates against the US dollar by 7.3% and 4.8% respectively in the first and second years. An appreciating exchange rate leads to falling exports and, consequently, shrinking aggregate demand. With excess supply over demand, CPI inflation falls by around three percentage points in the initial two years. Because of differential inflation rates between EEA and other regions in the world, EEA's real effective exchange rate appreciates 2.5% and 1.2% in the first and second years.
EEA's exports fall by 2% in the first two years after introducing full exchange rate flexibility, then gradually recover and begin to expand in the fifteenth year. It might be surprising that EEA's imports also decline at around the same pace as exports, despite currency appreciation inducing a substitution toward cheaper imports. The falling income associated with output contraction, as well as the rising real interest rate due to lower inflation, lead to weaker domestic demand. As shown in Figure 3A , EEA's investment and consumption fall by 3-4% in the initial two years, dampening demand for imports. As a result, EEA's current account surplus declines only by 0.8% of GDP in the first year. Reflecting the importance of export demand in EEA economies, this economic bloc experiences a large and sustained GDP contraction in the wake of its currency appreciation.
Despite the relatively large effect on its own economy, EEA's currency appreciation has only modest effects on other regions (left panel of Figure 3B ). Given its strong economic linkage with EEA, Japan experiences the largest contraction in trade, with a 0.8% decline in exports and a 0.5% decline in imports in the initial two years. The US is less affected and ROW is the least affected, consistent with their limited respective export dependence on EEA. As both exports and imports shrink, the current account balances of the US, Japan, and ROW change little following EEA's introduction of full exchange rate flexibility and currency appreciation. Consequently, the effects on their real GDP range from 0.20% to 0.35% in the initial years and are less than 0.1% annually afterwards. 
D. Expanding Domestic Demand in Emerging East Asia
The results of our fourth scenario-EEA's domestic demand expansion in addition to its full exchange rate flexibility-are plotted in Figure 3A and the right panel of Figure 3B . As shown in Figure 3A , the rise in domestic consumption and investment partly offsets the negative effects of currency appreciation on EEA's output, resulting in a smaller initial loss in GDP compared with the fourth scenario. As stronger domestic demand sucks more imports and discourages exports, the imports of EEA rise by 2-6% and its exports fall by around 6% initially. As a result, the current account surplus of EEA declines by 5% of GDP over a period of decade. Reflecting the changes in relative prices induced by the demand expansion in EEA, the real effective exchange rate of the EEA currency appreciates much more-by around 4% initially-than in the fourth scenario.
The deterioration in EEA's current account balance is mirrored in the improvement in the current account balances in other regions of the world. As shown in the right panel of Figure 3B , the current account balances of the US, Japan, and ROW improve by 0.4-0.6% of their respective GDP. Although US experiences larger export expansion in comparison to ROW, its gain in the current account balance is smaller due to its lower trade dependence. Rising net exports in non-EEA regions stimulate their GDP growth in the short-run, but declining domestic demand soon dominates the improvement in net exports, resulting in GDP contraction from the fourth year onwards. The reason is that rising domestic demand in EEA reduces its trade surplus and, hence, net capital outflows, pushing up real interest rates globally. With the negative effect of higher real interest rates on investment and consumption dominating the improvement in net exports, GDP contracts in the US, Japan, and ROW over the medium-term. This result highlights the importance of the general equilibrium impacts on international capital flows in analyzing the long-term implications of adjustment in global current account imbalances. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined the implications of the global financial crisis, emanating from the US, and of a global fiscal stimulus package as well as EEA's dynamic adjustment toward global rebalancing. Specifically, using a calibrated global dynamic general equilibrium model, we have simulated the scenarios of a US recession, a global recession, worldwide expansion in fiscal spending, and EEA's rebalancing policies-such as introducing full exchange rate flexibility and expansion in regional demand. Simulation results of the first scenario suggest that a global financial crisis, which spreads demand contraction from the US to other regions in the world, would cause a slowdown in economic growth and trade all over the world. But the negative impacts are not evenly distributed across regions. Because of its exchange rate regime that stabilizes the currency against the US dollar, EEA is least impacted by a financial crisis, whether in the US alone or world-wide, in terms of output.
We have also investigated the effects of global fiscal stimulus in response to the crisis. With a global fiscal stimulus package of 2% of GDP for two years, world GDP is likely to be lifted by 2.0% and 3.0% during the period of fiscal expansion under the benchmark and accommodative monetary policy rules, respectively. This result suggests that fiscal stimulus combined with an appropriate monetary policy rule can serve as an important stabilizer for the world economy during the crisis. For EEA economies, given their high level of trade dependence, globally coordinated fiscal stimulus would be much more desirable than acting just on its own.
With its large current account surplus and increasing importance in the world economy, EEA's growth rebalancing policy is an important component of the global effort to unwind the global current account imbalance. The exchange rate inflexibility in EEA is widely regarded as a major impediment to global rebalancing. Our simulation results show that exchange rate flexibility alone in EEA would not contribute much to the correction of EEA's current account imbalance. Given EEA's highly export-dependent growth pattern, its currency appreciation would lead to large output and income losses, depressing its appetite for imports and reducing its current account surplus by only 2% of GDP. Other types of policies-particularly of a structural reform nature-to boost regional demand, supported by greater flexibility in the regional currency, would be needed to have a much larger and persistent impact on EEA's current account.
Indeed, an appreciation of 5% in EEA's real effective exchange rate, driven by its domestic demand expansion and nominal currency appreciation, is likely to reduce its own current account balance by 5% of GDP. However, without any adjustment in any other country, this change in EEA's current account will be largely evenly distributed among other regions of the world. The simulation results show that the US current account deficit narrows only by 0.5% of GDP under this scenario, hardly correcting the US and, hence, global imbalances. Although the global economic impact of EEA is growing, its rebalancing policy has limited impact globally, suggesting the need for policy actions on the part of the US in reducing its own current account deficit. Essentially, both the current-account surplus and deficit economies should implement policies in order to reduce the global imbalance and achieve sustained global economic growth.
Several important limitations of our modeling exercises should be mentioned. First, our model does not explicitly incorporate the linkages through global financial markets and the mechanisms of co-movements in asset prices. As they are important transmission channels through which the US recession may drag down the world economy and East Asia, our results likely underestimate the impacts of the US and global financial crises on the Asian economies. Second, the global financial crisis and the need for global rebalancing would require Asian economies to shift demand from external to internal sources. Using a static multi-sectoral general equilibrium model, our previous work has shown that, given the different product composition in domestic and external demand, this would involve substantial structural shifts in their production activities (Kawai and Zhai, 2009 ). Without sectoral disaggregation, our model does not fully capture the role of structural adjustment and the associated adjustment costs required for growth rebalancing. A dynamic general equilibrium model incorporating detailed sectoral disaggregation-including tradables and nontradables sectors-and inter-sectoral labor adjustment frictions would better serve the detailed analysis of dynamic impacts of the global financial crisis. Finally, recent advances in trade theory have emphasized the importance of the extensive margin in trade adjustment. Incorporating firm heterogeneity and dynamics of firm entry and exit into the traditional framework of new open economy macroeconomics model may somewhat alter the analytical results, and provide new insights about the implications of global financial crisis and rebalancing. 8 8 See Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007) and Kumhof, Laxton, and Naknoi (2009) for the incorporation of firm dynamics into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti (2008) analyzed the exchange rate adjustment to correct the global imbalance in consideration of endogenous firm entry and new varieties of exports of goods and services, suggesting milder exchange rate adjustments for closing US current account deficits.
APPENDIX: MODEL SPECIFICATION
A. Basic Setup
The model economy consists of four regional blocs which are indexed by r or s. Each region is populated by overlapping generations households with finite planning horizons as in Blanchard (1985) . Households are indexed by age a. In each region there are a continuum of firms and a continuum of labor unions, which are indexed by n [0,1] and ȝ [0,1], respectively. The time index in the model is t.
The model assumes the presence of an exogenous trend in labor productivity growth (at rate g-1). For a clear separation of an endogenous dynamic from an exogenous trend, we present all variables in detrended form through division by g. In each region the CPI is the numéraire of the economy and all national prices are expressed in terms of domestic consumption units.
In the model described below, subscripts denote region and/or time. The time index, t, is omitted when all variables in an equation are with the same time index. Regional subscript, r, is also omitted where doing so does not lead to confusion.
B. Demand and Trade
Domestic demand in each region comprises consumption and investment by households, firms and government. A composite good, XA, is used for final and intermediate demand. This composite good is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation of domestic goods, XD, and aggregate imports, XM.
where ı m is the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic goods. The Armington share parameters 
where Ĳ s is the sales tax rate. The demand functions generated from (A1) and (A2) are: (1 ) v is elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. Firms have the CES aggregator of the differentiated labor varieties provided by labor unions. As firms are assumed to be identical, the aggregate labor demand, L, can be expressed as:
where l P is the quantity of labor provided by union P and l V is the elasticity of substitution across labor varieties. Cost minimization of firms implies that demand for labor P is a function of the relative wage:
where w P is the wage paid to union P and the region's wage, W, is defined as:
D. Households
TT a is the lump-sum net tax for household a. 
where ș is the constant probability of survival in each period and Ȥ (<1) determines the speed of decline of an individual household's labor productivity throughout his lifetime.
The first order conditions of the forward-looking household's optimization problem with respect to B, B * , c, l and z yield the following arbitrage equations: 
G. Equilibrium
The equilibrium condition in the composite good market is that the supply of the composite good, XA, is equal to the sum of household consumption demand, government demand for consumption and investment, and private demand for intermediate inputs:
The equilibrium condition in the labor market in each region is:
The international bond is in zero net supply internationally. The market clearing condition for international bonds requires: 
